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Professor Schuck has given us a nuanced, thoughtful and provocative view
of the controversy over efforts to "open up the suburbs" to people of color and
the poor and working classes.' His in-depth look at the three landmark cases in
the controversy-New Jersey's Mt. Laurel,2 Chicago's Gautreaux,3 and
Yonkers infamous school and housing segregation fight4 (especially his
analysis of the Yonkers litigation)-are extremely helpful and ground his
recommendations and analyses concretely and practically.
Professor Schuck begins by reviewing generally our scheme of land use
regulation, pointing out both how concerned housing consumers are about
making a wise purchase, and how concerned they remain about protecting the
value of their investment. He notes the incredible stew of policies from every
level of government that affect the residential housing market, often at cross-
purposes. He then quickly reviews evidence about the extent of racial and class
segregation in our housing patterns, noting that there is some evidence that
racial segregation is lessening, and that suburbs are becoming more racially and
ethnically diverse.6
In exploring the causes of the racial segregation that still plagues our
neighborhoods, he points to the continuing legacy of a history of explicit
racism, but he focuses also on three other factors. First, he argues that people
choose to cluster with people like them for a variety of reasons-
"straightforward economic and social reasons, as well as for more elusive
psychological ones"-so that, even in the absence of discrimination, much
residential segregation would occur.
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Second, he notes that residential choices are constrained by a form of
prisoners' dilemma: Even if a family prefers a particular racial mix in their
neighborhood-let's say 50/50 white and African American-because the
family will be unable to secure and enforce agreement from its neighbors to
maintain the neighborhood at that level, the family's self-interest in protecting
the value of its investment in housing will prompt it to flee the neighborhood
(or to avoid the neighborhood if it is making an initial location choice), once
the neighborhood begins to integrate or nears the so-called "tipping point." 8
Third-and this is crucial to his analysis of the problem-he emphasizes
the role that what he calls "classism" plays in racial segregation. He argues that
classism-the belief that "one improves one's housing by ascending a ladder,
reaching higher rungs only when one's ability to pay rises" 9 is so deeply
ingrained in our capitalist system that it seems "the natural order of things." 10
Under a classist view, which Professor Schuck maintains is widely shared by
Americans, "Government... has no business inserting people who have not
climbed the ladder in the customary way into a neighborhood they cannot
afford among people who can afford it through their own (or family) efforts." 11
Professor Schuck believes that classism explains "much residential
segregation," although he recognizes that it is difficult to disentangle racism
and classism and that racism can be couched in classist terms.12 "Classism
countenances discrimination on the basis of wealth, income, social class, or
perceived ability to pay." 13
Professor Schuck then explores the ideal of residential diversity. He
supports the norm of non-discrimination-the idea that one should make one's
housing choices in markets unimpeded by the biases of others. He seems
somewhat ambivalent about going beyond a principle of non-discrimination,
however. He neither explicitly endorses nor explicitly condemns this classism.
But he notes that a "broad consensus has long existed that greater residential
mobility and access to suburban jobs for low-income families and racial
minorities, especially blacks, is essential not only for them but also for
American society as a whole., 14 The question is, however, what role law can
and should play in pursuing that leading policy goal.
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Professor Schuck then turns to a close analysis of three cases in which
judges tried to impose an affirmative obligation on government to increase
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demographic diversity in housing.' 6 Although he is skeptical of the judge's
goals-faulting the Mt. Laurel court, for example, for trying "to enforce a
substantive right of low- and moderate-income families to live in residential
communities that they could not afford without public subsidies,"-he focuses
primarily on remedy: He argues that the preferred tool for achieving greater
racial and economic integration is market-based vouchers, rather than mandated
fair shares, mandated inclusionary zoning, or bricks and mortar programs.'T
THE "SPECIAL" CHARACTER OF THE PROBLEM OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION
That very brief summary hardly does justice to Professor Schuck's careful
and nuanced analysis, but it is enough to allow us to look further at several of
the issues his analysis raises. First, this chapter tackles the problem of diversity
in a context that is different from the workplaces, educational institutions,
religious houses of worship, and national borders that he addresses in other
chapters. Several differences are stark. To begin with, the problem of managing
diversity in the context of where people chose to live, or are forced to live,
underpins many of the other problems. Where you live to a large part
determines what educational opportunities you have, what religious institutions
you have easy access to, what jobs are available and accessible to you, what
kinds of health care you receive, what environmental toxins you are likely to be
exposed to, what social networks you are likely to belong to, what brushes you
are likely to have either with crime or with law enforcement, ,and so on. So,
managing diversity in housing choices is fundamental: Even if we were to
achieve the perfect solution to affirmative action conundrums in the workplace
or in educational institutions, for example, we would only have just scratched
the surface of providing truly equal access for educational opportunities if we
have not also managed to ensure that the neighborhood in which one grows up
is not so mired in a culture of poverty that educational opportunities are beyond
the imagination, much less the reach, of the neighborhood's residents.
Opportunity is so tied to geography that we have a special obligation to solve
problems of segregation in the housing market.
Second, managing diversity in the context of residential housing poses a
special challenge because, more than any of the other areas Professor Schuck
studies, it engages our federalist system of government-our delegation, or
reservation, to local governments of the power to control the use of land.
Third, while none of the areas Professor Schuck chooses to address are free
from government choices that have created or contributed to a lack of diversity
in the housing area, the role of government has been so pervasive (and
perverse) that it is simply impossible to imagine what neighborhoods would
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have looked like in a "free market" that left residential choices up to
consumers. From the federal government's massive highway project, to the
biggest housing program the world has ever known-the federal mortgage
interest deduction-to the blatant racism of the Federal Housing
Administration's redlining policies, the government has shaped our land use
and residential housing patterns from top to bottom. 18 Residential segregation
by race is a relatively new phenomenon. Prior to the turn of the twentieth
century, worker housing was located near employer housing. Some of the
current separation of classes and races can be attributed to changes in
transportation opportunities-maids, gardeners, nannies can now commute to
work more easily and need not live near the houses of their wealthy employers,
for example. But much is attributable to government policies that encouraged,
indeed required, residential segregation by race.
The pervasiveness of government policies that shape who lives next to
whom is not just a historical artifact. Today, the law does not allow one to
house her own grandmother, or nanny, in a granny flat. If one wants to live in a
mixed use neighborhood, most jurisdictions simply do not provide them. If one
wants to live in the center city, the tax ramifications of doing so make that
"choice" unavailable for all but the wealthiest of families. Indeed, if one wants
to live in any place other than the suburbs, the economics of doing so are
daunting, not because of the market, but because of the myriad ways in which
federal and state governments subsidize the cost of living in the suburbs. In
many parts of the country, if one wants to buy a new house, most of what is for
sale will be in a gated subdivision. So, while we extol individual freedom, and
bemoan the role that individual choices play in residential segregation, we
shouild not ignore the fact that law constrains those choices in so many
pernicious ways that the notion of "choice" is problematic.
Professor Schuck recognizes that "[t]he historical shame of Jim Crow may
affect whether we think today's choices are free enough to be given legal
effect, but it does not negate the fundamental value of choice."' 19 I would be the
last to argue against the value of choice, but to blame or excuse residential
racial segregation as a necessary risk we run by allowing choice is much too
simplistic. We are so far from a free market for housing, in which individuals
shop with their feet, that worrying over the risks to diversity ideals that choice
in a genuinely free market might pose misses the very real, immediate need to
18. The classic exploration of the causes of our current land use patterns is KENNETH JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); see also Richard
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1841 (1994). For a review of the literature attempting to quantify the extent to which various policies
contribute to suburbanization in general, and sprawl in particular, see GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: EXTENT OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON "URBAN SPRAWL" IS UNCLEAR
(1999).
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undo the legacy of distortions in the market.
The differences between residential segregation and the other contexts in
which Professor Schuck explores the meaning of diversity make several of his
general conclusions, both about premises and about principles, problematic in
the context of housing patterns.
DIVERSITY IS OFTEN A ZERO SUM GAME
One of the ways in which diversity is a zero sum game receives little
attention in Peter's discussion, and is conspicuous in its absence. The average
American has a huge percentage of her assets tied up in her house, and much of
how Americans act-in the land use regulatory system, the tax scheme, the
educational system and elsewhere-is inextricably tied to their efforts to
protect and enhance the value of their investment. The sad truth is that
segregation pays-it props up the value of housing for white Americans. One
cannot even begin to think about solutions to the problem of segregation
without tackling current homeowners' resistance to taking any risk with the
value of their home and their resistance to any redistribution of wealth. That
problem is one that Professor Schuck's emphasis on vouchers simply ignores:
Who is going to pay for the subsidy that vouchers reflect? The money to fund
the vouchers in Gautreaux came from the federal government, but the federal
government has shown no interest in expanding the program to any meaningful
level. Indeed, the Bush administration recently announced that it was
drastically cutting back on the program. Local governments have no incentive
to provide vouchers because of fear that the vouchers will simply attract poor
residents from neighboring jurisdictions. State governments too have been
unwilling to put enough money on the table for housing. So where are the funds
to subsidize low income renters and send them into the housing market going to
come from?
Further, if we were to suddenly decide to make the voucher program
address more than a tiny fraction of the need, what good will vouchers do when
they become sufficiently widely used that neighbors feel threatened and seek to
restrict rental housing that could be used for voucher residents?
DIVERSITY'S VALUE DEPENDS ON ITS PROVENANCE
There is little doubt that Americans, and probably everyone else as well,
prefer to choose their own destiny rather than have it imposed by a court, or
any authority figure or outsider, for that matter. But that observation is trite,
and Professor Schuck is never trite. Instead, his contention is much more
nuanced. He argues that "[t]he most plausible account of the disputes that arose
in these communities, then, is that the mandated diversities seemed inauthentic
precisely because they were mandated and lacked the only provenance, ability
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to pay, that Americans value as a legitimate eligibility criterion for residential
communities."
20
I question Professor Schuck's belief that classism largely explains our
residential patterns. Exclusionary zoning in particular, and land use policy in
general, is not just about ensuring that the only entrants to the community are
people of the same social class as the existing residents. Many of the people
already there-the ones adopting the exclusionary zoning policies-could not
afford to live there either if their housing was forced to conform with the
standards they impose on newcomers, or if they had not been the beneficiaries
of massive subsidies that are not or were not equally available to the
newcomers, and especially to people of color or the poor. Further, at least
some, and perhaps much, of exclusionary zoning is less about ensuring the
social class of newcomers, and more about rent-seeking-trying to expropriate
the wealth of new entrants-as a "price of admission."
In addition, exclusionary zoning is about protecting privilege, protecting the
value of homes. That value has relatively little to do with hard work or other
bases for a "moral" claim about merit and has much to do with the ways in
which government has subsidized the American dream of homeownership, for
some, but by no means all, voters. While ability to pay might be an agreed-
upon criterion in our capitalist, individualistic society, that criterion loses it
legitimacy when ability to pay can be deliberately manipulated by haves
against the have-nots. It is not appropriate to tell people that it's just a matter of
them climbing the ladder, when the rungs of the ladder are constantly raised
higher and higher by those already in a jurisdiction.
GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT TRY TO CREATE, CERTIFY OR CULTIVATE
SPECIFIC DIVERSITIES, BUT SHOULD FOCUS INSTEAD ON PROTECTING
DIVERSITY FROM DISCRIMINATION AND MONOPOLY
Professor Schuck argues that law is "seriously disabled ' 21 in generating
diversity because it is "so much harder for government to promote new
diversities than to protect old ones."22 But that depends, of course, on your
baseline. Is the goal of promoting racial and economic integration in housing
seeking a "new diversity"? Or is it seeking to undo the intended and unintended
segregative effects of decades of myriad public policies?
Professor Schuck would confine government's role to protecting diversity
from discrimination and monopoly. Land use regulation is a monopoly-
existing residents act through their local governments to limit the availability of
land in the jurisdiction to protect their investments. The more limited the land
20. Id. at 319.
21. Id. at 324.
22. Id. at 321.
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for new housing, the more valuable the existing housing. Again, Professor
Schuck's emphasis on vouchers pays insufficient attention to the monopolistic
tendency of existing homeowners. Vouchers only work if there is a sufficient
supply of rental housing to create vacancies for which the vouchers can be
used. By leaving the existing system of land use regulation essentially
untouched, Professor Schuck's emphasis on vouchers will not accomplish the
goal of protecting diversity from discrimination and monopoly.
CONCLUSION
Professor Schuck has made a very significant contribution to our thinking
about diversity generally and residential segregation specifically. The latter
topic has spawned dozens of book-length explorations, so Professor Schuck
cannot be expected to solve in a chapter problems that have vexed others in
thousands of pages. Professor Schuck has begun an important conversation, but
to go further, we must deal with the complexities that the three special features
of residential segregation-the lack of anything approaching a free market, the
pervasive role of government in creating segregated communities, the
connections between residential segregation and almost every other social
problem we confront today-pose to achieving greater diversity.
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